Introduction
The Nyāya school has developed its own unique argument about the theory of time. The classic theory of the school is presented in Nyāyasūtra (NS) and its commentary, Nyāyabhāṣya (NBh). Both works investigate the nature of the three times as part of the discussion on the object of reasoning (anumāna). The theory of time developed there is quite characteristic as to the two point: first, the existence of a hypothetical opponent that accepts only the existence of the past and the future, and denies the present; and second, reliance of the concept of action (kriyā) as the main factor that determines the present, the past, or the future. Previous studies on the Nyāya school s theory of time have focused primarily on its relationship with Buddhist theories, such as those from the Mādhyamika and Sarvāstivāda schools. Miyasaka (1966) conducted one of the most significant of these studies, which discussed the relationship between the theory of time found in NS and NBh and some Buddhist theories. Miyasaka concludes that the opponent referenced in NS is Mādhyamika, and that Nyāya borrows some ideas from Sarvāstivāda. On the other hand, Bhaduri (1947) refutes the assertion that the opponent is Mādhyamika, because Mādhyamika ordinarily negates the existence of all of three times. In this paper, I will (1) address whether the opponent of Nyāya s theory of time is Mādhyamika, and (2) determine which of the four major theories of Sarvāstivāda influence Nyāya s theory the most.
The Opponent s Assertion Described in NS and NBh
The discussion of time in NS and NBh begins with NS 2.1.39, which states the opponent s opinion. NBh interprets this sūtra as follows: First, consider the path from the branch of the tree to the ground when the fruit falls from the branches. At this time, it is possible to divide the path of the fruit into the section above and the section below the fruit. The fruit Theory of Three Times in Nyāya (Watanabe) has already traveled the upper section of the path; this is the path already fallen, which represents the past. On the other hand, the lower section of the path is the path to be fallen : that is, the path representing the future. Thus, the past and the future are represented by spatial counterparts that is, the upper and lower paths. Accordingly, there is no third path that represents the present, because the present is expressed only as the point of the fruit, without any width, on the path. 1) Miyasaka (1966) attributes the denial of the existence of the present to Mādhyamika school. However, Bhaduri (1947: 206-207, n. 45 ) criticizes the modern scholars who consider that this statement represents the view of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school, because Nāgārjuna also denied the existence of the past and the future. Consequently, Bhaduri concludes that this claim belongs to some unidentified realist group.
To explore such contradictory arguments, it is necessary to examine the relationship between NS and Mādhyamika literature. Recent studies, including Kajiyama (1980), Bhattacharya (1977) , Bronkhorst (1985) , and Tola and Dragonetti (1995) , focus on a Mādhyamika text, Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (VP). VP criticizes the Nyaya school s 16 padārtha in detail, citing chapter 1 of NS, which introduces this concept. Therefore, all of these previous studies agree that VP was created after the first and fifth chapters of NS, which are older than the other chapters.
2)
More importantly, these recent studies have found strong relationships between NS and VP. Kajiyama (1980: 424) and Bhattacharya (1977: 273) compare VP with NS, and conclude their mutual influence. In addition, Tola and Dragonetti (1995: 8-12 ) provide a more detailed comparisons of VP and NS, and find widespread correspondences between them.
They show that a lot of the adversarial claims in NS chapter 2 are attributed to the Mādhyamika school.
3) For this reason, I consider NS 2.1.39 to represent the Mādhyamika school, though NS 2.1.39 itself does not appear in VP. However, if this is the case, we must It is not difficult to interpret the first two phrases. It would be contradictory to claim that the place traversed in the past and the place that has not yet been traversed are both currently being traversed, so these sentences evidently deny this. In contrast, the last sentence is more difficult to understand. Katsura explains it as follows:
... The present act of traversing is incompatible with the past and future paths of traversing. ... Therefore, the opponent described in NS and NBh is Mādhyamika even though its statement does not accurately depict Mādhyamika s complete argument.
Nāgārjuna seems to insist that

Nyāya s Argument Against the Opponent
The Nyāya school s argument against the opponent s introduced in NS 2.1.39 relies on the premise that the opponent acknowledges the existence of the past and the future. Below, I
will summarize NBh s description of the argument in NS 2.1.39:
1. The present, the past, and the future are represented by action (kriyā), like falling, rather than physical paths.
2. If there is no present action, there is no past or future action. In other words, the past and the future depend on the present.
3. Therefore, it is impossible for the past and the future to exist without the present.
In other words, if an entity is acting, then it is doing so in the present time and the past and the future are defined by the recognition of this present action. If that action is no longer
Theory of Three Times in Nyāya (Watanabe) occurring, then it occurred in the past. If that action has not yet begun, it will occur in the future. Thus, present time must exist if the future and the past exist. 4) This argument resembles a theory of Sarvāstivāda, which claims that all dharmas in the past, the present, and future exist. 5) There are four representative Sarvāstivādin:
Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva. Miyasaka (1966) 
Conclusion
In this paper, I support Miyasaka s argument that the opponent described in NS 2.1.39 is the Mādhyamika school. On the other hand, we should revise his opinion on the extent of the influence of Sarvāstivāda on the Nyāya school s theory of time because Buddhadeva s theory bears little resemblance to the theory of NS. Overall, Nyāya scholars did not quote Buddhist concepts entirely, but excerpted sections to reinforce their own theory.
Notes 1) NBh, 81.6-11: vartamānābhāvaḥ patataḥ patitapatitavyakālopapatteḥ // (NS 2.1.39) vṛntāt pracyutasya phalasya bhūmiṃ pratyāsīdato yad ūrdhvaṃ sa patito dhvā / tatsaṃyuktaḥ kālaḥ patitakālaḥ / yo dhastāt sa patitavyo dhvā, tatsaṃyuktaḥ kālaḥ patitavyakālaḥ / nedānīṃ tṛtīyo dhvā vidyate yatra patatīti vartamānaḥ kālo gṛhyeta/ tasmād vartamānaḥ kālo na vidyata iti // 2) There is controversy about whether Nagarjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school, is the author of VP. Kajiyama (1980: 424) and Bhattacharya (1977: 265) regard Nāgārjuna as the author of VP, while Bronkhorst (1985: 126) and Tola and Dragonetti (1995: 15) suspect that Nāgārjuna did not actually write VP. Though I cannot draw a conclusion on this problem, it is irrelevant to the purpose of this paper.
3) Only Bronkhorst (1985: 127) argues that the main source of the oppositional opinions in NS is Sarvāstivāda rather than Mādhyamika. Bronkhorst s discussion is based on similarity between NS 2.1.8-11 and a section in a Sarvāstivāda text called Abhidharmavijñānakāyapāda. He points out that both texts concern a rule prohibiting co-occurrence of two mental acts.
